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DEATH FROM AUTOEROTIC ASPHYXIATION AND THE
DOUBLE INDEMNITY CLAUSE IN LIFE INSURANCE
POLICIES: THE LATEST ROUND IN ACCIDENTAL DEATH
LIGITATION
by
FRANCIS ACHAMPONG*
INTRODUCTION
Apart from the traditional death benefit payable under life insurance policies,
there may be added benefits such as the accidental death benefit, waiver of
premium for disability, and the guaranteed insurability rider.
On the application of the insured, and for an additional premium, the ac-
cidental death benefit may be added to the basic death benefit in a life insurance
policy, if the insured meets the particular insurer's underwriting requirements
for the coverage.' The accidental death benefit is provided in an amount equal
to the policy face 2, hence the reference to "double indemnity" in the context
of the accidental death benefit.
Policies containing an accidental death benefit may employ different ter-
minology in according the coverage. Some courts have recognized two types
of clauses - "accidental means" clauses on the one hand, and "accidental death"
or "accidental result" clauses, on the other.'
For coverage under an accidental death clause to be triggered, only the
result need be accidental. Thus, even where a voluntary or intended act is engag-
ed in, coverage is still afforded under an accidental death clause as long as
the result is unintended or unexpected. On the other hand, coverage under an
accidental means clause is triggered only if the means or cause(s) of death
themselves are accidental. Thus, in states recognizing a distinction, the accidental
means clause is more restrictive than the accidental death clause.
*LL.B. (Ghana), LL.M, Ph.D (Univ. of London), LL.M (Georgetown), member of the New York Bar.
Associate Professor of Business Law and Insurance, Norfolk State University, Norfolk, Virginia.
IIt is an integral part of some life insurance policies. Accident and health insurance policies may also
insure against accidental death.
2Thus, in a policy with a $100,000 limit, the accidental death benefit would be $100,000, resulting in a
$200,000 recovery for accidental death within the coverage of the policy.
3See, GREIDER. CRAWFORD AND BEADLES, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 210 (1984); also, AP-
PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 360 (1981) (where he refers to the "accidental means" provision
as "that simple, yet tricky, little term"). This distinction was recognized in cases such as National Life
and Accident Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 430 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Braley v. American Home
Assurance Co., 354 So. 2d 904, 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); McKinnon v. Republic National Life
Ins. Co., 25 Wash. App. 854, 862, 610 P.2d 944, 948 (1980) (Reed, C.J., concurring). The actual wording
of either type of clause has many variations. For a sample of each, see GREIDER. CRAWFORD AND BEADLES.
at 210-211.
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Many states, owing to the practical problems arising from attempting to
distinguish between the two clauses, have abrogated the distinction, treating
accidental means clauses like accidental death clauses. Others have done so
to accommodate the reasonable expectations of the ordinary policyholder.4 In
a dissenting opinion in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. 1, Justice Car-
dozo stated that "the attempted distinction between accidental results and ac-
cidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog." 6 Some
states, however, still uphold the distinction.7
Accidental death litigation has brewed for over a century or more on diverse
issues. The latest round in accidental death litigation, however, concerns
autoerotic asphyxiation, a rather bizarre sex act involving a deliberate reduc-
tion of the supply of oxygen to the brain to heighten sexual pleasure. 8
This paper examines the cases that have been decided on this issue, seek-
ing to determine whether recovery under the double indemnity provision revolves
around the type of clause used in the policy, or on the particular jurisdiction's
stand on what is "accidental," regardless of policy language. The author seeks
to determine whether any particular trend may be elicited from these cases that
may shed light on the likely disposition of future cases.
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF DEATH FROM AuTOERorIc ASPHYXIATION
There are at least five reported cases in which different courts had to con-
sider whether death from autoerotic asphyxiation was accidental for purposes
of the double indemnity provision.9 Only two of the cases allowed recovery
4In Wisconsin, for example, an "average man" test is used in interpreting the term "accidental means."
Wiger v. Mututal Life Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 95, 105, 236 NW. 534, 538 (1931); also, Stoffel v. American
Family Life Ins. Co., 41 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 164 N.W.2d 484, 487 (1969), where the Wisconsin Supreme
Court stated that "Wisconsin has elected to follow the "average man test' in defining the word 'accident*
rejecting the narrower definition that requires an unforeseen event as well as an unanticipated result.
5 291 U.S. 491 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
1d. This was reportedly a reference to Lake Serbonis in Egypt in which armies were engulfed. In abrogating
the distinction in Colorado. the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "'Whatever kind of bog that is we con-
cur.- Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 235, 67 P.2d 80, 81 (1937). See also,
GREIDER. CRAWFORD AND BEADLES. at 211. The authors note that most life insurers use the "accidental
death" formulation in their policies.
7 Nicholas v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.. 451 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1971); Praetorian Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Humphrys. 484 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
8 Death from playing Russian Roulette, shooting during an altercation, jumping out of a moving car, physical
exertion and numerous other situations have been the subject of accidental death litigation. According
to medical testimony in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981), some forty deaths per year are reported in the United States from this practice of autoerotic
asphyxiation.
9 Four of the cases involved life insurance policies: Kennedy v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 136 Wis. 2d
425, 401 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d
199 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Runge v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1976); Sigler
v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Iowa 1981), aff'd, 663 F2d 49 (1981). One involved
an accident policy: International Underwriters, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 1084 (4th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 21:2
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under the double indemnity provision.' 0
Jurisdictions Denying Recovery Under the Double Indemnity Provision
In Runge v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. "1, Sandra Runge, a widow,
sued Metropolitan Life to recover under the double indemnity provision of two
life policies insuring her deceased husband's life. Her husband had died while
engaged in an autoerotic act, during which he had placed a noose formed from
an electrical extension cord around his neck to enable him to vary the pressure
on his neck. He lost consciousness due to an accentuated asphyxia during
orgasm, and hanged to his death.' 2
The insurer paid the death benefit, but refused the accidental death benefit,
arguing that death was not from "accidental means" as required by the policy.
The District Court rendered judgment for the insurer, and Sandra Runge ap-
pealed. The sole issue on appeal was whether or not Mr. Runge died by "ac-
cidental means."
Affirming the decision of the District Court, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that Mr. Runge's death was not by accidental means. The
court cited language from a Virginia Supreme Court decision to the effect that
"Where the policy insures against loss of life through accidental means, the
principle seems generally upheld that if the death of the insured, although in
a sense unforeseen and unexpected, results directly from the insured's volun-
tary act . . ., it is not death by accidental means, even though the result may
be such as to constitute an accidental injury." '3
In International Underwriters, Inc. v. The Home Ins. Co. 14 the insurer re-
fused to pay the accidental death benefit under two accident policies. The in-
sured had died from autoerotic asphyxiation. The decedent in this case used
a noose equipped with a pulley designed to protect him from asphyxiation if
he lost consciousness, since he would lose his grip on the rope controlling the
pulley, and the pressure on the noose would abate. The pulley system jammed
[ORecovery was denied in Runge, 537 F.2d 1157; Sigler, 506 F. Supp. 542, aff'd, 663 F2d 49 (1981); and
International Underwriters, 662 F2d 1084. Recovery was allowed in Kennedy, 136 Wis. 2d 425, 401 N.W.2d
842 and Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 619 S.W.2d 199.
"537 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1976).
121d. at 1158.
13 Smith v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 202 Va. 758, 761, 120 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1961). The Virginia
Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in Wooden v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 205 Va. 750,
755, 139 S.E.2d 801, 804 (1965), where it noted that ". . . death or injury does not result from ... ac-
cidental means within the terms of an accident policy where it is the natural result of the insured's volun-
tary act,..." In Smith, the insured was burnt to death when tear gas grenades hurled by police accidental-
ly set a barn, in which he was hiding, on fire. Smith had shot at the police and seriously wounded one
officer. In Wooden, the insured visited his estranged wife's home and was shot following an argument.
See, also, Boyd v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 219 Va. 824, 252 S'E.2d 307 (1979), where double indemnity
was denied for the death of an insured who was killed when he visited the home of his girlfriend's
ex-boyfriend.
14662 F2d 1084 (4th Cir. 1981).
Fall, 19871
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when the insured lost consciousness, causing him to die from asphyxia.' 5 The
policy covered "accidental bodily injury," injury being defined to include death.' 6
The issue, therefore, was whether the decedent's death was "accidental
death." The District Court held that the death was accidental, since it resulted
from a malfunctioning of the pulley system. In overturning the District Court's
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that because the
decedent voluntarily placed his neck in the noose and tightened the same to
the point where he lost consciousness, his death was the natural result of a
voluntary act unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except death or injury.
Thus, his death was not an accident. 17
The District Court had distinguished the Runge decision 8 partly because
it said Runge concerned an "accidental means" policy, while the policy here
covered "accidental result." 19 Although the Court of Appeals noted that Virginia
may recognize a distinction between accidental means and accidental results
policies2°, the court nonetheless followed the Runge decision because the Virginia
Supreme Court did not explicitly differentiate between the two types of policies
in its Smith decision.2'
In Sigler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. 22, Mrs. Sigler claimed the ac-
cidental death benefit under a group insurance plan covering her husband who
had died while engaged in an autoerotic act which resulted in his asphyxiation
by hanging. The insurer denied the accidental death benefit, and Mrs. Sigler
sued in District Court. Summary judgment was entered for the insurer, and
Mrs. Sigler appealed. The sole issue on appeal was whether Mr. Sigler's death
was an accidental death under the terms of the insurance agreement and Iowa
law. The policy contained an accidental result or accidental death clause. It
excluded intentionally self-inflicted injury of any kind.
The court referred to the definition of "accidental" by the Iowa Supreme
Court. That court had stated that "... if the insured does a voluntary act, the
51Id. at 1085.
1
6
1d.
'
71d. at 1087. The court referred to the Smith decision, where the Virginia Supreme Court stated that death
or injury does not result of an accident or accidental means within the terms of an accident policy where
it is the natural result of the insured's voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the
death or injury. 202 Va. at 760-61, 120 S.E.2d at 268. The court also referred to the definition of "acci-
dent" as adopted in Virginia in Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Glover, 165 Va. 283, 285, 182 S.E.
221, 222 (1935), where an "accident" was defined as "An event that takes place without one's foresight
or expectation; an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event; chance;..."
18662 F.2d at 1086.
19 Counsel for appellees had argued the point at trial. Id.
20662 F.2d at 1086, where the court refers to such possible recognition in language in Newsoms v. Com-
mercial Casualty Ins. Co., 147 Va. 471, 475, 137 S.E. 456, 457 (1927), and in Smith v. Combined Ins.
Co. of America, 202 Va. 758, 761, 120 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1961).
21662 F2d at 1087.
22506 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
[Vol. 21:2
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natural, usual, and to be expected result of which is to bring injury upon himself,
then a death so occurring is not an accident in any sense of the word, legal
or colloquial; . 23 The court decided that Mr. Sigler's death was not an
accident since a reasonable person would have recognized that his actions could
result in his death. The court found that a reasonable person would comprehend
and foresee that placing a noose around his neck and subsequently hanging
himself for the purpose of inducing asphyxia could result in his death2 4 Although
the court recognized that Mr. Sigler did not intend to cause his own death,
it reasoned that he reasonably should have expected that his actions could be
fatal .25
Jurisdictions Allowing Recovery Under the Double Indemnity Provision
In Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie 26, the insurer refused to
pay the accidental death benefit under Mr. Tommie's group insurance policy
after his death from asphyxiation. Mrs. Tommie brought suit and was awarded
judgment upon a jury finding that the death was an accident and not the result
of intentionally self-inflicted injury. The insurer appealed arguing, inter alia,
that death was not the result of an accident.
The court referred to its own analysis of decisions concerning death aris-
ing from dangerous or negligent activities, where it had concluded that
"... the mere fact that a person's death may have occurred because of his
negligence, even gross negligence, does not prevent that death from being an
accident within the meaning of an accident insurance policy. It is only when
the consequences of the act are so natural and probable as to be expected by
any reasonable person that it can be said that the victim, in effect, intended
the result ..."27 The court concluded that "although the type of activity in
which Mr. Tommie was engaged was foolish and fraught with substantial risks
of injury or death, it was not of such a nature that the insured should have
reasonably known that it would probably result in his death." 28
23Lickleider v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 184 Iowa 423, 429, 166 N.W. 363, 366 (1918). The Iowa
Supreme Court had also stated in Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers Ass'n, 186 Iowa 454, 464-65,
172 N.W. 454, 458 (1919), that where the insured knew and appreciated the danger, or the risk was so
apparent that as an ordinary reasonable man he must be held to have known and appreciated it, and with
the knowledge intentionally assumed the risk, death would not be accidental. Lickleider had been relied
on by the Eighth Circuit in Continental Casualty Co. v. Jackson, 400 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1968).
24506 F. Supp. 544.
21Id. The court found Runge persuasive. It also decided that even if Mr. Sigler's death was an accident,
recovery would be barred by the clause excluding "intentionally, self-inflicted injury of any kind." Id. at 545.
26619 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
27Freeman v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 580 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Cir. App. 1979). The court stated that more
is reuqired than a simple showing that the insured could have reasonably foreseen that injury or death
might result. 619 S.W.2d at 202. Medical testimony was presented on behalf of Mrs. Tommie to the effect
that death is not the normal expected result of autoerotic behavior, but would be considered unexpected.
There was also testimony that the insured had probably engaged in the practice for several years. Id.
28619 S.W.2d at 202-03.
Fall, 1987]
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In considering whether the death was the result of a self-inflicted injury 29,
the court referred to the ordinary meaning of "injury," since it was not defined
in the policy.30 The issue was whether a reduction of the supply of oxygen to
the brain in order to produce a state of hypercapnia is an injury within the nor-
mal and usual meaning of that term. The court stated that a state of hypercap-
nia simply alters the amount of oxygen in the brain, thus heightening or inten-
sifying certain body sensations, and that it could be accomplished by various
drugs as well as by other means. Thus, the court held that Mr. Tommie did
not intentionally inflict bodily injury upon himself in the normal and usual
meaning of that term, upholding the jury's finding.3'
In Kennedy v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. 32 Mr. Kennedy, an orthopedic
surgeon, died while engaged in an autoerotic act. His death resulted from
strangulation from a noose. The insurer denied Mrs. Kennedy's accidental death
benefit under a group life policy containing a clause of the "accidental death"
type. Mrs. Kennedy brought suit and was awarded summary judgment by the
trial court, which concluded that the death was accidental. 33 The insurer ap-
pealed. The sole issue related to whether the term "accidental death" in the
policy included death from autoerotic asphyxiation.3 4
The court pointed out that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had adopted
an "average man" test interpreting the term "accidental means" in Wiger v.
Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York 35, and that this test had been reaffirmed
in Stoffel v. American Family Life Ins. Co. 36
The court stated that if an insured does a voluntary act where the natural,
usual or expected result would cause injury or death, such injury or death would
not be an accident in any sense of the word.37 The court stated that more is
required than a simple showing that injury or death might result, and that it
is only when the consequences of the act are so natural and probable that it
can be said the insured, in effect, intended the result and it was, therefore, not
29The jury had found that it was not.
30619 S.W.2d at 203.
31 Id.
32136 Wis. 2d 425, 401 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
331d. at 426, 401 N.W.2d at 843.
341d.
35205 Wis. 95, 105-06, 236 N.W. 534, 538-39 (1931), where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
"to eliminate from the definition of 'accidental means' all cases where the injury happened as the natural
or foreseeable result of a force or event voluntarily set in motion by the insured may have some scientific
justification, but is contrary to the common understanding of the term and tends unfairly to limit such
policies to cases where the insured is guilty of no negligence."
3641 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 164 N.W.2d 484, 487 (1969), where the court stated that "Wisconsin has elected
to follow the 'average man test' in defining the word 'accident' rejecting the narrower definition that re-
quires an unforeseen event as well as an unanticipated result to constitute an accidental happening." The
insured in Stoffel had died from a massive hemorrhage caused by the strain of lifting a heavy wagon.
37 136 Wis. 2d at 432, 401 N.W.2d at 846. The court referred to definitions of "accident" in the American
Heritage Dictionary (1976) and Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1977). Id. at 430-31, 401 N.W.2d at 845.
[Vol. 21:2
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accidental. The court held that there was no evidence that Kennedy's death
was highly probable, expected or a natural result. Mr. Kennedy participated
in the act solely for sexual gratification, and all the circumstances indicated
that he would emerge from the experience alive and without injury. The court
inferred from the circumstances that Mr. Kennedy had done this same act on
previous occasions. 3 8
A DiscuSSION OF THE VARIANT POSITIONS
The decision in Runge revolved around the voluntariness of the insured's
conduct and the "accidental means" language in the insured's policy. The Virginia
Supreme Court had held that where death results directly from the insured's
voluntary act, it is not death by accidental means although in a sense unfore-
seen.39 Since Runge deliberately placed his neck into a noose and intentionally
and deliberately self-induced asphyxia by hanging himself in the noose, his
death was a natural and foreseeable, though un-intended, consequence of his
activity 4° Smith and Wooden were cases dealing with the accidental means pro-
vision. Runge also dealt with the accidental means provision. Runge was,
therefore, within the Smith and Wooden decisions. The Virginia Supreme Court's
decisions in Smith and Wooden were to the effect that death resulting from a
voluntary act was not death by "accidental means," even though unexpected.
The Supreme Court's decision in those cases did not purport to lay down a
broad principle applicable to both accidental means and accidental death situa-
tions. As a matter of fact, the court used language that arguably recognized
a distinction between the two types of double indemnity provisions 4 The deci-
sion in Runge was clearly within Virginia law.
Against the background of Smith, Wooden and Newsoms, however, some
legitimate questions may be raised concerning the International Underwriters,
Inc. 42 decision. The Fourth Circuit refused to distinguish Runge although what
was involved there was an "accidental means" policy. The Fourth Circuit stated
that since the Smith decision did not differentiate between the two types of
policies at that point, it would be applied here.43 But the Smith decision did
not have to reach the issue as to whether the holding would be different in an
accidental death, as opposed to an accidental means policy. In fact, the Smith
and Newsoms courts had used language implicitly recognizing a distinction be-
tween the two types of policies. In Smith, the court held that on the facts, Smith's
"I1d. at 433, 401 N.W.2d at 846.
39Smith v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 202 Va. 758, 761, 120 S.E.2d 267, 269; also Wooden v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 205 Va. 750, 755, 139 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1965).
40537 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1976).
4' See Smith v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 202 Va 258, 261, l20 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1961); also, Newsoms
v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 147 Va. 471, 475, 137 S.E. 456, 457 (1927).
42662 F.2d 1084 (4th Cir. 1981).
43 d. at 1087.
Fall, 1987]
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death was not effected by an accident within the meaning of the policy. 4 Before
arriving at this conclusion, the court had quoted language from a decision that
had stated that where death results from a voluntary act of the insured, it is
not death by accidental means, although unforeseen or unexpected.4 5
The Fourth Circuit, however, refused to acknowledge that the Virginia
Supreme Court was implicitly recognizing a distinction between accidental means
and accidental death language, choosing to interpret the holding that "death
was not effected by accident within the meaning of the policy" independently
of the quoted passage from Scarborough and the wording of the policy.46 The
Virginia Supreme Court in Smith was only saying that the accidental means
requirement of the policy had not been satisfied.
The International Underwriters decision was not within the Smith and
Wooden holdings, which were that death resulting from a voluntary act was
not death by "accidental means," although unforeseen. The Fourth Circuit should
not have extended the decision in Smith and Wooden to "accidental death" or
"accidental results" cases. In states where the distinction between the two types
of clauses has been obliterated, the courts use a test independent of policy
language, such as the "average man" test employed in Wisconsin 47, or the
foreseeability test employed in Iowa48 to all double indemnity provisions,
regardless of policy language. Such was not the case in Virginia at the time
of the International Underwriters decision. The Fourth Circuit should, in the
least, have secured an advisory opinion from the Virginia Supreme Court, in-
stead of independently determining the future direction of Virginia law on such
an important issue.49
The Sigler decision did not revolve around the terminology in the policy,
Iowa apparently making no distinction between accidental means and acciden-
tal death or accidental results policies. Instead, a foreseeability test is used to
decide the issue of whether death was accidental in all policies. The District
Court held that ". . . a reasonable person would comprehend and foresee that
placing a noose around his neck and subsequently hanging himself with the
noose for the purpose of inducing asphyxia could result in his death." 50 The
44202 Va. at 762, 120 S.E.2d at 269.
4 5Scarborough v. World Ins. Co., 244 N.C. 502, 505, 94 S.E.2d 558, 561, quoted in Smith, 202 Va. at
761, 120 S.E.2d at 269.
46662 F.2d at 1087, nn. 1, 2. In the Newsoms case where the insured died of ptomaine poisoning after
eating pork and beans, the court held that the death was from accidental means since it was an uninten-
tional taking of a poisonous substance which the insured thought edible. The death was, therefore, anything
else but usual. 147 Va. at 474, 137 S.E. at 457.
41136 Wis.2d at 430, 401 N.W.2d at 845.
48506 E Supp. at 544.
49 The Fourth Circuit did not arguably apply Virginia law as written by its highest court in this diversity
case, as required by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
50506 F. Supp. 544. Although the court cited the Runge decision with approval, it must be noted that
Virginia was not employing a foreseeability test independent of policy language. The Sigler and Runge
decisions were not, therefore, identical.
[Vol. 21:2
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decision was, therefore, consistent with Iowa law on the issue.
It is interesting that the District Court in Iowa also found that Mr. Sigler's
death was, in any case, intentionally self-inflicted, since "... his voluntary
acts were intended to temporarily restrict his air supply . , whereas the
Texas Court of Appeals held that it was not, since a state of hypercapnia sim-
ply alters the amount of oxygen in the brain and may be accomplished by drugs
as well as other means.
52
The Texas courts do not employ a foreseeability test, but on the contrary,
employ an expected, intended or inevitable results test, where the policy in-
sures against "accidental death," as opposed to death by "accidental means."
In the words of the court, the consequences of the act must be "so natural and
probable as to be expected by any reasonable person that it can be said that
the victim, in effect intended the result and it was therefore not accidental..." 53
The courts in Wisconsin reject the foreseeability approach, adopting in-
stead, an "average man" test in considering issues of whether death is "acci-
dental death" or from "accidental means." The court in Kennedy stated that
"More is required than a simple showing that injury or death might result.
It is only when the consequences of the act are so natural and probable that
it can be said the insured, in effect, intended the result and it was therefore
not accidental." 54 The "average man" test is, in effect, identical to the intend-
ed or inevitable results test employed in Texas in "accidental death" cases. The
court in Kennedy stated that "... there are occasions when an insured partici-
pates in some act where serious injury or death is highly probable or an inevi-
table result. Under no circumstances can or should that conduct be termed ac-
cidental." 55
CONCLUSION
It is obviously up to the various states to define their approach to the issue
of whether death in any particular set of circumstances is accidental for double
indemnity purposes. There is no universal position on this issue. As such, the
question as to whether death from an autoerotic act is "accidental death" or
death from "accidental means" will depend on several factors. One factor would
be whether the particular state where suit is instituted recognizes a distinction
between the two types of double indemnity provision. If it does, then there
5 1Id. at 545.
52619 S.W.2d at 203.
531d. at 202.
54136 Wis. 2d at 432, 401 N.W.2d at 846.
151d. It might be mentioned that constitutional questions have been raised where a publisher was sued
for emotional harm resulting from death of an adolescent who had read an article describing the autoerotic
practice in Hustler magazine. The Court of Appeals (5th Cir.) of Texas, reversing a lower court judgment,
held that the magazine article was entitled to first amendment protection, since it did not incite perfor-
mance of the act. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 84 F 2d 1017.
Fall, 19871
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may be coverage under an "accidental death" or "accidental results" policy,
but not under an "accidental means" policy. On the other hand, if no distinc-
tion is drawn between these two types of policy provisions, then the resolution
of the dispute will revolve around the test used in that state to determine the
issue of whether death is accidental, independently of policy language. This
could be a "foreseeability" test as in Iowa, an "average man" test as in Wisconsin,
or some other test. Recovery may be denied under the first, but accorded under
the second.
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